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Fieldwork at Mit Rahina was not going well, and the team in charge of the new, Egyptian-
American archaeological excavations at the site had reason to be worried. It was early 1956 
and, in Cairo, ten miles or so to the north, construction work bearing the imprint of Egypt’s 
Free Officers was continuing apace. The press reported that grand buildings and boulevards 
linked to the modern, revolutionary and decolonized future promoted by Gamal Abdel Nasser 
were taking shape. And even in the countryside at Mit Rahina, the field team could see this 
process in action. Not far from the excavations, representatives from Egypt’s Department of 
Antiquities (DoA) were busy erecting a large, modern museum structure to lure curious 
tourists to visit a gigantic statue of the pharaoh Ramses II that would be housed therein.
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Nasser’s Egypt was to be monumental, the country’s pharaonic era reborn as a visible 
precursor of its modern, revolutionary future (Fig. 1). But beyond Mit Rahina’s new museum, 
and despite the concerted efforts of the practitioners working there, there was little sign of 
this revolutionary rebirth at the site. For years, Egyptologists, influenced by ancient writings, 
had associated Mit Rahina with Memphis, a place said to have been Egypt’s ancient capital 
and “the city of the white wall”.2 Yet even if this monumental characterization of the locale 
was accurate, the excavations at the site, now in their second season, had done little to 
demonstrate its validity. Despite arduous months spent digging down into muddy, 
waterlogged remains, no ancient city materialized, and the people in Cairo and the United 
States charged with deciding the status of the work were unconvinced of its future potential. 
To make matters worse, ruptures between the field team and some of their workers were 
increasing. This paper is about what the excavation team at Mit Rahina did in their attempt to 
resolve these problems, in addition to the wider historical issues connected to this process.  
The Mit Rahina excavation was initiated in 1953 and cancelled by 1957. It constituted 
a novel sort of collaboration between the DoA and the University Museum (UM) of the 
University of Pennsylvania, aimed at instituting a new foundation for archaeological work in 
Egypt; the excavation was premised on contemporary schemes of modernization linked to 
Nasserism, decolonization and the early Cold War. In this paper, I demonstrate that 
practitioners working at Mit Rahina changed the type of field visualization that they used 
there in an attempt to emphasize that the site constituted a city and save their work. 
Addressing the complex materiality of the site, these practitioners switched from an 
epigraphically connected practice of architectural drawing standard in Egypt to the sort of 
visual strategy promoted in pre-independence India by the British archaeologist Mortimer 
Wheeler (1890–1976), particularly in terms of archaeological section illustration.3 To analyse 
this change, I draw on the concept of the ‘boundary object’. Such objects are things around 
which the various stakeholders of scientific work can gather to form an effective community 
of practice.
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 In order for the collaboration at Mit Rahina to succeed, it was clear from the 
beginning that the dig had to be made to function in a way that drew such stakeholders 
together. The work at Mit Rahina offered space for the constitution of a boundary object from 
its start. I therefore use the concept to illustrate not only how and why a change in visual 
strategy took place at Mit Rahina, but also why this strategy failed.   
Moreover, thinking through the work at the site in terms of boundary objects enables 
me to link the Mit Rahina excavation to other issues: the role of materiality in the making of 
the post-World War II past, in addition to the histories of decolonization and the Cold War to 
which that past was connected. Previous studies of these histories have tended to be 
dominated by a realist concentration on top-down international relations.
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 Yet as muddy and 
visually opaque as they were, the excavations discussed in this paper can clarify how 
decolonization, the Cold War and the pasts connected to these categories were tied to, and 
constitutive of, the (quite literally) ‘ground up’ materiality of specific places such as Mit 
Rahina. The paper also, then, emphasizes the relevance of the history of archaeological work 
in thinking about these matters. As interest in the history of the so-called field sciences has 
grown, historical interest in the discipline of archaeology has not necessarily grown alongside 
it.
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 Yet archaeological fieldwork—and the issues of materiality connected to it—helped to 
constitute varied post-war geographies. For example, as this paper ultimately shows, Nasser’s 
Egypt was not the India in which Mortimer Wheeler’s work would later enjoy continuing 
influence. The post-war world was not flat, and nor were the geopolitical categories tied to it. 
Instead, all these things were materially bound; to coin a phrase, they were rather more 
lumpy. By discussing the case of Mit Rahina, this paper demonstrates why. 
 
Decolonizing Ancient Egypt 
 
Whether accurately or not, the proposals governing what happened at Mit Rahina represented 
the work as a new type of excavation: one attuned to the era of Egyptian decolonization under 
Nasser. A now-standard historical narrative illustrates why this argument was possible.
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 As in 
other countries subject to colonial rule, archaeological excavation and survey in Egypt had 
been contentious for decades. Who defined the Egyptian past? Who controlled the institutions 
and individuals interested in its inquiry, and who could take control of the sites, monuments 
and artefacts that excavation and survey helped to constitute and recover? In the era of the so-
called New Imperialism and Britain’s (post-1882) occupation and control of the country, 
these were questions that drove debate in Egypt; a debate heightened by nationalist 
contention, the presence of foreign archaeological concessions and an Egyptian Antiquities 
Service placed (because of the terms of the Entente Cordiale) under the permanent 
directorship of a Frenchman and staffed by many British officials.  
After 1922, when the discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamun coincided with Britain’s 
granting of—nominal, and tightly controlled—independence to Egypt, matters seemed to 
improve somewhat, at least from a nationalist perspective. A new cadre of Egyptians began to 
graduate from the country’s growing number of universities with qualifications relating to 
antiquities. These graduates—often, although not always, trained by Europeans—then used 
their qualifications to work in the Antiquities Service at the same time as the distribution of 
Egyptian antiquities abroad (highly desirable to the sponsors of foreign missions) became 
more controlled. Tutankhamun’s tomb acted as a bellwether in this matter: despite the 
controversy surrounding this outcome, artefacts from the tomb never left Egypt.  
But matters really appeared to change following the Free Officers’ coup of July 1952. 
The Officers forced King Faruq, the British-backed monarch of Egypt, to abdicate. And in 
1954, the turning of Egypt’s political tide led the British government to agree to the 
withdrawal of its remaining troops in the country. Meanwhile, matters related to Egyptian 
antiquities themselves became embroiled in these changes. In late 1952, the French director 
of the Antiquities Service, Étienne Drioton (1889–1961), found himself out of a job. He was 
replaced by Mustafa Amer (1896–1973), an Egyptian geographer and prehistorian who had 
been head of Alexandria (formerly Faruq) University. Egypt’s government also reconstituted 
and renamed the institution that Amer now led. Formerly possessing a remit relating solely to 
the country’s pharaonic past, the Antiquities Service became the DoA and was tasked with 
dealing with all facets of Egypt’s pre-nineteenth-century history.     
 Much in the country also continued as normal. The revolution—and Nasser’s role as 
its figurehead—started more as a feat of political representation than as a political reality. In 
the early days of their coup, the Free Officers had planned to return to their barracks; they 
wanted only to set what they saw as a corrupted Egypt back on a sound national course. Yet 
increasingly, the regime and the press represented Egypt as revolutionary: particularly after 
the moment in 1954 when Nasser helped to place Egypt’s first president, his fellow Free 
Officer Muhammad Nagib, under house arrest. But even then the revolution often simply 
developed interwar modernization schemes. As revolutionary rhetoric heightened in 
conjunction with Nasser’s apparently inexorable rise (in 1956) to the Egyptian presidency, 
(revolutionary) appearance could often override reality.
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In this political climate, foreign institutions that still wanted to excavate in Egypt saw 
a need to tread carefully. For example, in the months following the Free Officers’ coup, 
Britain’s Egypt Exploration Society (EES) was granted a concession to dig at the site of 
Saqqara “on behalf of, and in collaboration with, the Department of Antiquities”.9 This 
agreement was almost entirely rhetorical: committee minutes reveal that the “collaboration”, 
suggested by the EES, provided an excuse to continue the earlier work of the British 
organization’s new Field Director, the archaeologist Walter Bryan Emery (1903–1971), who 
had excavated monumental tombs at the site whilst working for the Antiquities Service in the 
interwar period.
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 The plans for Mit Rahina went further, however, and are therefore worth 
examining in some detail. 
 
Modernizing Ancient Egypt 
   
Initiated after the EES excavations, the programme for the Mit Rahina work set out to attend 
not only to the rhetoric, but also to the slow development of Egypt’s revolution. The dig’s 
supporters, whether Egyptian or American, promoted the work as a new way of conducting 
archaeology in Egypt. The excavation was to help constitute a novel and altruistic field 
practice that paid real attention to the modernization policies enjoying a growing currency in 
the country (and, by extension, in the decolonizing world at large). The dig would implicitly 
follow such policies as they were promoted by the American government, too. Multiple, 
competing interests circulated around the Mit Rahina work from the start.  
For the Egyptians involved, the proposed work represented the chance both to assert 
their modernizing credentials and to further the conditions in which those credentials might 
flourish. Interwar discussions about modernization and the place of Egypt in the world were 
being absorbed into revolutionary discourse. As the EES work at Saqqara suggests, this 
discourse did not discount, and in fact often encouraged, various forms of international 
collaboration. But the Mit Rahina work represented an attempt to take advantage of the 
currency held by one particular nation; as the Cold War heightened and Britain’s empire 
crumbled, the US had moved to gain influence in the Middle East. Interestingly, Egyptian 
officials appear to have specifically targeted the UM—and not, say, the EES—as a possible, 
and genuine, collaborative partner for the DoA.  
In early 1953, on behalf of Egypt, one Ali R. Ansari held an informal discussion in 
Philadelphia regarding the possibility of the UM working in the country. The conversation 
took place with the head of the institution’s Egyptian Section, the émigré German 
Egyptologist Rudolf Anthes (1896–1985), and the UM’s director, Froelich Rainey (1907–
1992). Correspondence with Egypt’s Ministry of Education and the Egyptian Embassy in 
Washington followed and, in September 1953, Mustafa Amer of the DoA himself visited 
Philadelphia to discuss matters.
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 Amer had first been trained at Cairo’s Dar al-ʿUlum, an 
institution borne of late nineteenth-century reforms that trained future schoolteachers using a 
hybrid (Arabic-Islamic/European) curriculum. Next, he had attended the University of 
Liverpool, where he took a BA and an MA in geography. Amer’s course of study had led him 
to believe in the value of collaborative scientific internationalism for national development.
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Now was the right time to put this ideal to work, and the UM appeared to be the right 
collaborative partner. Meanwhile, in a series of meetings that Rudolf Anthes conducted in 
Egypt in early 1954, many of the Egyptian archaeologists who occupied the upper echelons 
of Amer’s DoA followed suit in stressing their enthusiasm for collaboration. Many of these 
practitioners were interwar graduates of Egyptian institutions. They possessed strong 
nationalist beliefs but, like Amer, they had also become predisposed to scientific 
internationalism. Working with the UM presented a genuine opportunity to advance this aim 
and their work.
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These archaeologists also had other reasons for supporting collaboration. After his 
initial visit to Egypt, Anthes selected Mit Rahina as the location of the collaborative work 
rather than any of the other sites that departmental officials offered him. Work at Mit Rahina 
suited departmental officials well, because it helped to advance one of the policies adopted 
under the Free Officers in the early days of their command. In September 1952, the Officers 
instigated agrarian reform, redistributing land and placing boundaries on its ownership. The 
measure was limited in size, and was more the product of interwar discussions relating to 
Egyptian modernization than of any revolutionary fervour. Yet in his final proposal for the 
Mit Rahina work, Anthes emphasized that digging at Mit Rahina would support Egypt’s new 
land reform policy:  
 
I should like to stress that …the Egyptian government is 
immediately interested in its [Mit Rahina’s] clearance; the question 
is how far this area should be reserved to the Antiquities Department 
and the rest be given free to the peasants, for cultivation.
14
  
         
Meanwhile, other novel aspects of the Mit Rahina collaboration were tied up with the 
interests of the UM and, in particular, with Froelich Rainey. Known for hosting the hit CBS 
television show What in the World?, Rainey was charismatic, politically active and 
promotionally astute. He had worked for the US foreign service, had connections to the 
fledgling CIA and was deeply involved in discussions about America’s role in the world 
during the early Cold War: from the late 1940s onwards, he was a member of the 
Philadelphia Committee on Foreign Relations. When he took control of a cash-strapped UM 
after the Second World War, Rainey developed an aggressive programme of international 
fieldwork designed not only to prove attractive to sponsors, but also to sell a positive, 
altruistic vision of America to enable collaboration with geopolitically strategic countries.
15
     
Thus, with (the firmly anti-totalitarian) Anthes appointed as leader, the UM would 
work in Egypt with these aims in mind.
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 At Mit Rahina, a programme of skill transfer would 
take place. Embodying the modernization narrative promoted by contemporary American aid 
programmes, the UM pledged to provide experts to help the DoA build technical capacity in 
the field. Simultaneously, this process would quietly inculcate American values amongst the 
Egyptians involved. American aid programmes in the early Cold War had developed out of 
the interwar work of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which sought to develop 
adherence to national ideals in this Depression-hit area of the American South. To do so, the 
TVA worked to build liberal rural communities at the same time as conducting agricultural 
and other reforms. Now, under its new development programme, Point Four, the US 
government rolled out this practice of using agricultural reform to constitute good Americans 
(or, more accurately, good American allies) around the world. In Egypt in the mid-1950s, for 
instance, not only did the US sponsor a winsome-sounding programme of “Chicken Aid”, it 
also created the Egyptian-American Rural Improvement Service.  Although not officially 
linked to these programmes, it is perhaps no surprise that Rainey proposed the work at Mit 
Rahina should echo such schemes and take place as an “Egyptian-American archaeological 
research programme”.17 Not only did many Egyptians seem to welcome such initiatives, but 
work at the site was already tied to issues of land reform. Positive omens aside, though, the 
success of the Mit Rahina work now relied on the sort of material that the excavation 
recovered.         
   
Choosing Mit Rahina 
 
The proposals linked to the Mit Rahina excavations meant that the collaboration would be 
sustained only if it appeared to be making visible the Egyptian past that all the parties 
involved with the work were concerned with. More accurately, the work would have to 
materialize just enough of that past, and just enough of the artefacts connected to it, to make 
sure that everyone would want to continue work at Mit Rahina and not allow the land at the 
site return to agricultural use. The site needed to act as a boundary object around which 
diverse interests could gather. Unsurprisingly, then, Mit Rahina appears to have been chosen 
by Anthes in order to provide as great a chance as possible of this outcome occurring: the site 
offered a sense of material possibility that fitted with these various desires. 
Despite the slow-burning arrival of revolution in Egypt, a particular vision of 
monumentality had started to coalesce in the country: whether in terms of the remaking of 
Cairo or in terms of the manner in which the new regime and its institutions represented the 
national past. These processes had clear, pre-1952 origins, but could now be used to 
advantage in the quest to construct a modern, revolutionary Egypt. Places like Mit Rahina 
therefore received new museum structures to house monumental pharaonic sculpture; the 
colossus of Ramses II displayed within the building represented the glories that such new 
structures hoped to revive. Meanwhile, in January 1955, as Anthes arrived at Mit Rahina to 
prepare for the first season of excavation, he noted in his diary that “the Minister of 
Municipal and Rural Affairs visits old Ramses, who shall be carried over to Cairo”.18 The 
Minister, Wing Commander ʿAbd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, had also taken charge of the 
construction work in the city, and had come to Mit Rahina to visit a second colossal statue of 
Ramses II.
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 Plans dictated that the statue should be raised from the ground where it lay and 
then transported to Cairo’s main railway station, where it would stand outside this major 
gateway to the capital, welcoming passengers to Egypt’s revolutionary future.20 The 
symbolism was obvious, and acted as an accompaniment to other, overt acts of pharaonic 
monumentality; in the Egyptian desert, workmen constructed gigantic pharaonic temples and 
other sets for the shooting of Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten Commandments.21    
 A glorious pharaonic past was increasingly visible as part of Egypt’s revolutionary 
future. Taking place in the midst of these events, excavating at Mit Rahina offered a 
calculated chance to bolster this visibility and rematerialize Egypt’s former glory. As noted 
above, the site had long been associated by Egyptologists with Memphis, Egypt’s ‘capital 
city’ during the so-called Old Kingdom: the period (c.2686–2125 B.C.) also defined as the 
age of pyramid-building.
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 Yet in reality, little evidence of that settlement had been recovered 
beyond the connected (and highly visible) pyramid and cemetery fields on its neighbouring 
desert escarpment at sites like Giza and Saqqara. The city proper, located in what was now 
the Nile’s floodplain (or so scholars claimed), had barely been excavated.23 Excavating at Mit 
Rahina therefore offered considerable opportunities. 
 Anthes bet that the form of archaeological skill he set out to transfer could resurrect 
pharaonic monumentality at the site on a significant scale. He said of Mit Rahina: “in the 
long run, it promises important discoveries with certainty.”24 He was confident, because the 
team was to treat work at Mit Rahina as they might have treated work on a standing structure. 
Elsewhere in Egypt, where excavation and survey dealt mostly with the sort of temples and 
monumental tombs that Anthes expected to find, this approach had rendered results. Many of 
these structures were (or could be made to appear) free-standing, or be helped to ‘emerge’ 
from within their location on the desert edge (Fig. 2). Perhaps more importantly, though, this 
methodology had also been practised by Rudolf Anthes with individuals who had developed 
professional credibility as a result of such work. Using this standard, then, the assumption 
was that Mit Rahina could become a successful boundary object.   
Anthes had first gained field experience in Egypt during the 1920s, working for the 
Imperial German Institute of Egyptian Archaeology in Luxor from 1927 to 1929. The 
Institute’s leader, Ludwig Borchardt (1863–1938), “intended to establish his own branch of 
Egyptology within the field of architectural history”.25 This process, linked to grand 
narratives of European civilization, involved surveying ancient structures to provide an 
architectural account of the phases of ancient Egyptian history. Meanwhile, this process was 
similar to work in other places embroiled in monumental ancient-historical discourses, 
suggesting the extent to which Anthes hoped to apply what appeared to be a universal norm 
of excavation, despite the occasionally problematic connotations of its usage. In Mussolini’s 
Italy, for instance, Roman archaeology was “dominated by topographic approaches whose 
primary goal was the recovery and reconstruction of specific sites. … already recorded in the 
historical narrative”.26    
The technique investigated and illustrated ancient historical architectural phases using 
a method of top-down (i.e. horizontal) planning. At the same time, philologists like Anthes 
copied the inscriptions on and around the structures being investigated, analysis of which 
sources provided evidence of the date of the architecture within ancient Egyptian history.  
Occasionally, too, practitioners produced sumptuous, near-modernist reconstructions of 
ancient temples and other monumental structures. For instance, work conducted under 
Borchardt at the site of Amarna in Middle Egypt and eventually published by Herbert Ricke 
(1901–1976), a friend of Anthes from Luxor, illustrates this set of practices in action.27 
Meanwhile, around Mit Rahina, archaeologists excavated sites in a similar manner and, 
before the dig started, Anthes discussed work with these well-known, highly respected 
professionals.
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 On the Saqqara desert escarpment a few miles to the west, Emery, whose 
training was originally as a marine draughtsman, made architectural plans and reconstructions 
of monumental tombs for the EES; his publications also featured the inscriptions connected 
to these structures. In the low desert across the river at Helwan, one of the first publications 
of the Egyptian archaeologist Zaki Saad’s (1901–1982) excavation of the tombs at the site 
was its plan.
29
   
In Egypt, one mode of (monumental, modernist, and philologically connected) 
excavation dominated, cutting across a variety of different national and professional 
backgrounds. It is little wonder that such work influenced practices at Mit Rahina; not only 
could the technique make ancient monuments live again as symbols of—in this case 
revolutionary—modernity, it also constituted a standard that Anthes understood. By 1954, 
Borchardt’s Imperial German Institute had become the Swiss Institute for Architectural and 
Archaeological Research in Cairo. Ricke was now the institution’s director.30 When Anthes 
conducted final negotiations with the DoA in early 1954, he had intense discussions with his 
old friend in an attempt to find an architect for Mit Rahina. Anthes could conduct philological 
work at Mit Rahina himself. Yet he noted that he wanted “to try and get Ricke’s assistant [a 
trained architect], and an Egyptian student of architecture, in order to take the advantages of 
the supervised architect and to raise an Egyptian man in this field”.31 Architecture was to be 
the paramount focus of the dig’s vaunted training element.  
 This focus seemed all to the good.  Excavating at Mit Rahina would uncover 
monumental remains dating from beyond the Old Kingdom and tie in with the symbolic work 
being carried out in Egypt around pharaohs like Ramses II. Ramses ruled during the New 
Kingdom: the period (c. 1550–1069 B.C.) often defined by Egyptologists as comprising 
Egypt’s ancient ‘empire’.32 That empire was now increasingly ripe for reconstitution as 
Nasser’s pan-Arab ambitions grew.33 Accordingly, Anthes noted in the Mit Rahina proposals 
that the work “should reveal” the “religious centre of Memphis during the Empire”.34 
Excavating at Mit Rahina would uncover the monuments of an imperial past that might now 
live again. Even if the dig ensured that some land at the site would return to agricultural use, 
the work would also help to make Egypt’s revolution material by resurrecting ancient 
Egyptian glories. Some of DeMille’s Hollywood glamour would brush off on everyone 
involved.      
 This strategy also encompassed a scientific claim. Beyond revealing a religious 
centre, Anthes hoped that the rather more mundane chance to visualize the “layouts … 
development, and … relation to other sections of the city” of that centre would make the 
work self-evidently compelling to both sides involved.
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 For years, Egyptologists had cast 
doubt about the feasibility of excavating at Memphis: the site’s location in the Nile’s 
floodplain meant that there was a considerable amount of groundwater to contend with. The 
British archaeologist Flinders Petrie (1853–1942), who excavated at the site in the early 
twentieth century, stated that “to clear the temple sites alone would take probably twenty 
years, as it is only possible to work for a few weeks after the water has subsided”.36 Even the 
UM had worked at the site and then abandoned it.
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 Worse still, Bernard Bothmer (1912–
1993), Cairo director of the new American Research Center in Egypt, described the site as 
“dust” even as the new excavations started.38 For Anthes, excavating at Mit Rahina was a 
chance to prove these doubters wrong and advance his discipline’s work. Here, he thought, 
was the future of excavation in Egypt.
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 If that experiment could be successfully conducted—
if Memphis could actually be visualized and made material as a boundary object—then all 
parties should be interested in continuing the work. 
Material success also offered great opportunity for the UM. The institution’s 
management and financial backers had made clear from the start their wish to export objects 
excavated from the site to America, despite no real confirmation from the DoA that this 
outcome would happen. Beyond Rainey, the institution’s Board of Managers was particularly 
keen on this strategy. Percy Madeira, a Philadelphia banker and the Board’s president, later 
made this point particularly clear, stating that the work should result in “worth while [sic] 
discussion of objects”.40 Moreover, as plans for the work progressed, the UM appointed a 
“Project Director”, John Dimick, “to handle the business management and public relations of 
the expedition”.41 Dimick (as much, if not more of, a Cold Warrior than Rainey) was only 
involved in the work because his wife, Marion Tully Dimick, had made a substantial financial 
gift to the UM.
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 Yet nonetheless, he had also been tasked by the UM with seeking out other 
possible sites in Egypt for excavation.
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 And it is notable in this regard that he once stated 
that Percy Madeira “never presented himself as an expert, but he knew what was good for the 
Museum, and when appropriated funds were producing adequate dividends”.44 Those 
dividends would be the sort of monumental, pharaonic artefacts that could be transported to, 
and displayed in, Philadelphia and that Mit Rahina, according to Anthes, apparently offered 
the best chance of securing. The age of the avaricious museum—and the symbiotic 
relationship of such institutions with the field—was far from over.45  
Yet despite the varying interests connected to the excavation, the work at Mit Rahina 
is now forgotten, and a later project embodying modernization discourses is remembered: the 
UNESCO-backed archaeological salvage campaign that took place in Egyptian and Sudanese 
Nubia during the 1960s. The Nubian campaign, which took place as a result of the flooding 
caused by the construction of the Aswan High Dam, involved the work of technical experts 
from countries located across post-war political divides. Its most famous act was the moving 
of the monumental temple of Ramses II at Abu Simbel. As I have noted elsewhere, currently 
available histories often make this process of international collaboration in the name of 
revolutionary modernism appear to have taken place sui generis.
46 But considering its 
thematic similarities, the excavation at Mit Rahina seems to represent a precursor to the later 
campaign. Why, then, did the worlds of modernization and archaeology intersect so 
convincingly in Nubia but not in the decade beforehand? The rest of this paper addresses this 
question, making clear the utility of thinking about the work in terms of boundary objects.  
 
Monumental Failure 
 
At Mit Rahina, nothing monumental was to be seen. The network of interests and aims 
connected to the work broke down as the excavation team struggled to find a method to solve 
this problem. They could not make the site a boundary object. Beyond her substantial 
financial gift to the excavation, Marion Tully Dimick worked at the site during the first 
excavation season. She also wrote a book about ancient Memphis, whose subtitle was The 
City of the White Wall. Her words illustrate how ill at ease she became with this epithet upon 
experiencing the site. 
 
Our station wagon stopped but the angry disturbed dust rolled about 
us in a choking cloud. A quiet scene, palm trees, green stretches of 
cultivation, a tiny village. This was the site of ancient Memphis. We 
tried to visualize in comparison with New York, the greatest city of 
the modern world, teeming with people of diverse nationalities and 
tongues . . . . Now wipe it out.
47
 
  
For Marion Dimick, Memphis had to exist on a monumental visual plane. The 
problem was that it didn’t. Others echoed her views. John Dimick wrote of Mit Rahina upon 
his arrival there that “I was not too impressed… lots of holes dug here and there”.48 In his 
words, a particular visual logic was at work: one that connected the site to ideas of urban 
(pharaonic) grandeur. Yet Mit Rahina was all “holes”. It was certainly not emblematic of the 
sort of shiny, New York-style modernity with which ‘the city’ might now be associated, 
whether in the America from which the Dimicks hailed or in the environs of a Cairo that was 
being rebuilt on a monumental level.  
Nor could the site be made emblematic. The Dimicks were all-American newcomers 
to Egypt. But their inexperience and unease reflected the more general difficulties that the 
Mit Rahina excavation team experienced as they attempted to hold together the networks of 
interest that surrounded the site and make ancient Memphis a tangible, visible, valuable thing. 
Mit Rahina constituted a field site, a concessionary area of excavation defined by prior 
agreement. Yet that does not mean that the locale’s status as a ‘site’, meaningful beyond its 
concessionary identity, was established. Marion Dimick wrote that Memphis only existed “in 
museums, [and] on library shelves”.49 She was not far wrong. Despite Anthes’ confidence 
about Mit Rahina’s potential, he and his team now had to work to persuade others that this 
potential could be fulfilled. He had to make concrete the site’s status as a boundary object.    
Moisture formed a significant obstacle to this outcome. Taking up their time and 
energy, the workers employed on the excavation had to constantly pump out groundwater 
from the bottom of trenches (Fig. 3). But beyond this inconvenience, the interaction of the 
water with the ancient material embedded within the site’s ground also created a shifting and 
confusing morass of strata. Initial plans involved excavation at an area called Kum al-Fakhri, 
one of the mounds (ākwām; sing. kūm) that dotted the site.50 Digging down within Kum al-
Fakhri’s various layers, it became clear that elements of the hoped-for monumental remains 
existed. However, making these remains appeal to interested parties as a boundary object 
created difficulties, because the modes of visualization that had taken root as part of 
established Egyptian excavation practice did not appear to do an effective job at making this 
messy, earth-bound monumentality—and therefore the site or city itself—seem coherent. At 
Mit Rahina, the standards associated with the coming into being of boundary objects broke 
down.
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 Working within the norms of Egyptian excavation practice, the team at the site found 
representing its monumental remains difficult, if not impossible.         
Anthes had not been able to employ Ricke’s assistant. Instead, he employed Jean 
Jacquet, an architect who had previously worked in Iran for the French Délégation 
Archéologique. Jacquet’s initial practice at Mit Rahina was as desired, a process defined as 
“mapping”.52 This work complemented other activity carried out during the dig’s first season 
in 1955. Anthes, true to his background, copied inscriptions, and the Dimicks drove around 
the site, constructing a map of the extant visible remains of Memphis. Meanwhile, the 
labourers employed on the work excavated in plan: in the various trenches they dug, they 
progressed downwards in horizontal spits. For example, on the first day of work, the first 
level dug descended 40 cm, and at a point horizontally cross-referenced with “stick 19 of 
Dimick’s survey”.53 The excavation aimed to create a small series of horizontal plans within 
a much larger one, progressive architectural snapshots of ancient Egypt as constituted at Mit 
Rahina. 
Within any trench at the site, then, the team aimed to excavate to a recognisable 
bottom layer and to plan the features along the way. At the start of the second week of the 
work, Anthes noted of the initial trench that “a firm floor between two walls is reached”.54 
For a long time to come, though, this self-confident practice of characterizing excavated 
remains would disappear. The team could make little visual sense of the ruins that now 
appeared in Mit Rahina’s ground. In April 1955, during the first excavation season, Anthes 
wrote in his diary: “which investigation could I possibly make … in order to find out whether 
or not this excavation should be continued.” Even after consultation with Ricke, Anthes 
reflected that “Herbert doesn’t see any [obvious] solution either”.55 
 Confusion reigned. When the team at the site excavated “walls”, they felt confident in 
giving them this characterization, but could not always suggest what wider role these 
structures had once played. Nor could they suggest when, exactly, they dated from, even in 
terms of a relative chronology. One structure, excavated in 1955, appeared particularly 
problematic. The team termed this structure the “4m.-wall” in reference to its width, and 
later—during the second season of fieldwork, which took place in 1956—claimed it to be the 
southern part of a presumed wall surrounding a small temple of Ramses II. Yet a few days 
after its appearance, Anthes wrote that “I still wonder whether this wall belonged to the 
temple”, despite Jean Jacquet’s qualified assertion that it probably did.56 To a great extent, 
this uncertainty seemed to arise because of the various remains that surrounded the structure.  
 Viewing the wall in plan within these complex accumulations, Anthes and Jacquet 
found it difficult to make credible claims about the structure’s function. Unable to clearly 
visualize a monumental structure within the complex earth, the pair could not convince 
themselves of the parameters of its existence, let alone convince anyone else. The report that 
Jacquet completed after the end of the 1955 excavation season questioned why the 4m.-wall 
was not parallel to the structure to its north: the “Sanctuary” of the temple. Jacquet also noted 
that the wall appeared to be protecting the Sanctuary from later accumulations of domestic 
and craft structures that had been built to its south. Viewed in plan, the wall did not (as 
expected) appear to be part of the temple, but rather appeared to be a later structure built to 
protect a sacred spot from incursion.
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 It was little surprise that Anthes, though keen to 
continue at Mit Rahina, wrote to Rainey that “there is nothing exciting in our work”.58 At the 
site, the excavation team was finding it impossible to constitute any coherent monument from 
the earth. As a result, they now faced significant pressure to justify their presence at Mit 
Rahina to the UM’s leadership. During the 1955 season, Percy Madeira inspected the dig and 
asked: “did we come all the way to Egypt to find the corner of a wall?”59 At Mit Rahina, 
(excavated) things were not looking good, and the site’s status as a boundary object looked 
illusive at best. 
 
People Problems 
 
Unfortunately, matters only got worse. In early 1956, as the second season of excavation at 
Mit Rahina started, the “crater-like excavation” was not the team’s only worry.60 They also 
had a connected trainee problem. For the most part, the individuals placed in charge of the 
actual work of excavation under the direction of the UM’s team worked steadily. They 
constituted a body of skilled archaeological journeymen from the village of Quft in Middle 
Egypt. Originally employed by Petrie, these Quftis, as they had become known, now 
excavated across Egypt and the Middle East and took charge of the local villagers who were 
also routinely employed on excavations. Yet true to the stereotypical relationship of Cairene 
elites with their ‘backward’ southern compatriots (on which topic more below), the Quftis 
were not the ones to be given further training.
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 Instead, the opportunity of skill transfer was 
to be given to selected individuals employed by the DoA whom the modernizers in charge of 
the institution deemed to be both worthy and capable of development.  
 The training work at Mit Rahina constituted less a process of general archaeological 
skill transfer, more a process of transferring skills thought necessary to field leadership. But 
the breakdown in excavation routine meant that the individuals in charge attempted to 
transfer skills that seemed useless, stretching their credibility to breaking point. The failure to 
transform Mit Rahina into a boundary object where methodological standards could be 
successfully transferred meant that the authority of the dig’s leaders haemorrhaged. Indeed, 
this process had not even been tested during the first season of excavation in 1955. Aside 
from the many labourers employed at the site, the one non-Qufti Egyptian involved in the 
field that year was Hasan Bakry. Bakry was departmental Inspector to the excavation, and 
also took the role of Anthes’ assistant.62 This position, in addition to his possession of a 
doctorate, meant that it proved difficult to suggest that Bakry could be trained. To an extent, 
then, the dig’s training element failed from the start. But during the second season of 
excavations in 1956, the DoA had placed an architect named Ibrahim Abdel Aziz at Mit 
Rahina in order “to help us and to learn from Mr Jacquet”.63 Now, skill transfer mattered.   
 Given the team’s problems in the field, this situation did not augur well, although 
initially events seemed to proceed without trouble. In February 1956, during the first full 
month of the second excavation season, Anthes noted that “Abd el Aziz [sic] helps Jacquet 
with surveying”; there are numerous other such dull statements of routine throughout his 
diary that month.
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 Later in the season, though, things started to go wrong. Abdel Aziz could 
clearly carry out the appropriate sort of work—although not with a better outcome than 
anyone else at the site—and in fact had worked at a different area of the Memphite ruin field 
a couple of years previously.
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 The dig apparently pointless, he therefore came and went as 
he pleased. In April, Anthes phoned Mustafa Amer to tell him that “I should like to have him 
[i.e. Abdel Aziz] removed because we do not need him and do not want him any longer”.66 
Abdel Aziz turned up irregularly after this call, but never to much more than a frosty 
reception.   
 This issue, though, merely reflected wider problems. Anthes complained that Abdel 
Aziz “does not work in a consistent style. He puts the dig here and there … [and] no certain 
result has been obtained”.67  But no one else working at Mit Rahina could make a “certain 
result” materialize either. Meeting with Amer in early May 1956, Anthes implicitly admitted 
this point. After the meeting he wrote that “first I have to show that good work is done here; 
then students will come”. As ancient Memphis failed to emerge from the earth, the discourse 
of development and the authority of the appointed experts lacked force. Mit Rahina’s 
immanent status as a boundary object started to come undone, even for Anthes. At the 
meeting, Amer was similarly contrite, suggesting that individuals beyond those of the UM’s 
team also felt resistance to their authority and that the DoA found the work at Mit Rahina 
increasingly purposeless. “Amer expressed his regret that the boys [both Abdel Aziz and 
Bakry] were a failure of sorts”, and he and Anthes “agreed that it would be better to have 
young men”.68  
 Meanwhile, departmental officials often visited Mit Rahina to check on the work. The 
routine aspect of these visits, though, perhaps concealed the official unease already expressed 
by Amer. Their steady work meant that the Quftis under contract to work at Mit Rahina 
possessed considerably more authority than anyone else at the site, potentially disrupting 
established Egyptian social hierarchies and making the constitution of the site as a boundary 
object harder still. In revolutionary Egypt and before, villagers like the Quftis had become 
subjects of study and objects of paternalistic reform, but that was meant to be the extent of 
the intervention.
69
 Now, though, these objects of reform threatened to transgress the limits of 
the position that had been established for them.
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 Quftis had worked at Mit Rahina before: 
with Petrie, but also with Anthes’ UM predecessor at the site, Clarence Fisher (1876–1941). 
And only the Quftis could tell Anthes and his colleagues where these previous excavations 
had taken place, because extant maps did not clearly point to their location. Fikri, one of the 
Qufti ruʾasaʾ (foremen; sing. raʾīs) employed on the dig, told Anthes that “hearsay” said that 
Qufti labourers had planted certain palm trees during Fisher’s excavations to indicate the site 
of Petrie’s excavations.71  
 In order to dig anywhere at all, the excavation team depended on this Qufti 
knowledge. And the Quftis—who alone possessed the superior Arabic language skills 
necessary to communicate with the local villagers employed at the site—seemed aware of 
their value in this regard.
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 Anthes went so far as to complain about one (unnamed) raʾis 
being “demanding as often”, and refused a request that the Qufti labourers under this man’s 
control receive an extra bonus.
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 Yet, quite regularly, the value of the Quftis also forced 
Anthes into negotiations. During these negotiations, financial matters seemed pressing, 
suggesting that work only ever existed one pay day away from disruption.
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 Worse still, a 
precedent for such disruption existed: when Fisher had excavated at Mit Rahina, the Quftis 
employed by him had gone on strike.
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 Unless something was done, Mit Rahina’s immanence 
as a boundary object seemed set to collapse. 
 
Materializing Memphis 
 
The excavation team now attempted to remake the site as a place more suited to the sort of 
excavation supposed to be taking place there. This process was similar to that discussed by 
Christopher Henke, who studied the practices of scientific farm advisers working with 
Californian farmers to develop new growing practices. Henke’s study argues that these 
advisers face a “struggle to control the field and yet still make it appear ‘field-like’”. This 
struggle occurs because the advisers need to convince farmers that the growing practices they 
want to implement might be of value to the specific piece of land on which the farmers 
work.
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 Similarly, at Mit Rahina, Anthes and his team adopted a technology designed to help 
them obtain methodological control over the archaeological field at the same time as visually 
acknowledging the specificity of the time and place in which their excavation was taking 
place. They tried to run a tight ship and materialize a boundary object: an ancient city that 
would be persuasive to Egyptian and American audiences. 
This intervention was accidentally driven by the knowledge possessed by Anthes and 
others at the site of contemporary developments in archaeological method. In April 1956, 
Anthes recorded in his field diary that “most of the day was spent with reading Mortimer 
Wheeler, Archaeology from the Earth [my italics]”. Anthes was impressed, noting that the 
volume was “extremely good, gives a lot of suggestions for our work”.77 Wheeler (of the 
University of London’s Institute of Archaeology) had written his book in an attempt to shape 
archaeological practice in the post-war world. Perhaps most notably, he wrote that “to-day, 
the digger must learn to read his [stratigraphic] sections, or he should be constrained from 
digging”.78 As Gavin Lucas has noted, earlier archaeologists like Augustus Henry Lane-Fox 
Pitt Rivers (1827–1900), Britain’s first Inspector of Ancient Monuments, had used 
stratigraphy to help place excavated artefacts in evolutionary sequences conceived in terms of 
a linear Victorian narrative of human social evolution. Now, though, Wheeler claimed that 
his application of stratigraphy dealt with how understanding the organization of material 
found in the earth could be used to visually demonstrate the diversity of pasts within a 
universal human narrative. Through the practice of excavating, examining and—most 
importantly—depicting the stratigraphic sections formed by the interplay of soil and human 
debris at the edge of archaeological trenches, Wheeler claimed that archaeologists could 
demonstrate the relative nature of past worlds across the globe.  
In the post-war era, Wheeler’s was a powerful strategy. By changing the way that 
sections were visualized—if not, perhaps, the way in which they were excavated—Wheeler 
enabled the illustration of the sort of universalist relativism expressed by UNESCO and other 
recently founded multilateral institutions (Fig. 4).
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 His approach also possessed further 
ordering potential. Drawing on his military background and experience directing the 
Archaeological Survey of India, much of the methodology that Wheeler set forward rested on 
what he saw as the issue of organizing the workers charged with digging archaeological 
sites.
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 As a result—and alongside his London colleague Kathleen Kenyon (1906–1978)—
Wheeler set forward a system of gridded area excavation “capable of preserving for constant 
reference at a maximum number of points complete vertical sections until the last phase of 
the excavation”.81  
This system would regiment the places of the workers who laboured within this grid 
(Fig. 5), and in turn enable the apparently reliable constitution of multiple trench sections. 
These sections could then be interpreted in order to put together a comprehensive picture of 
settlement at any particular site. Furthermore, Wheeler implied that the apparent replicability 
of these sections would allow their use around the globe in order to build up a relative 
archaeological picture of the past that could truly be characterized as from the Earth. In 
particular, as formerly colonized countries started to gain independence, Wheeler attuned his 
discussion of stratigraphic method to the new national pasts that were primed to develop, 
chauvinistically suggesting that “there is no method proper to the excavation of a British site 
which is not applicable—nay, must be applied—to a site in Africa or Asia [Wheeler’s 
italics]”.82  
 Wheeler’s strategy possessed obvious applications at Mit Rahina. Given the apparent, 
and continued, success of the technique in newly independent India, not only might the 
Wheeler-Kenyon grid system help to order the site’s workers and trainees. The manner in 
which the system presented stratigraphic sections would also help to reveal the ancient city 
that Mit Rahina supposedly contained in a manner appropriate both to the age and, as a 
boundary object, to the work’s various different audiences.83 Yet, despite his positive 
impression of the volume, Anthes also took issue with some of Archaeology from the Earth’s 
content: he criticized Wheeler’s horror at “a method of recording that not long ago was 
widespread in the East and may in fact still survive there”. This method involved “the 
mechanical recording of every object and structure in relation to a fixed bench-level”, the 
type of horizontal excavation practice used at Mit Rahina. Wheeler claimed that this type of 
recording made the inconceivable assumption “that all objects and structures at the same 
level below (or above) datum line were in the same 'stratum', i.e. contemporary with one 
another!”84 In reality, the novelty of the way that Wheeler actually excavated stratigraphic 
sections is questionable, and in his critique he perhaps protested slightly too much.
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However, his words did rankle in Egypt, where a horizontal field perspective certainly 
dominated. Anthes wrote that “I think that his [Wheeler’s] criticism of the method is too 
sharp as our site and our understanding of the method … is concerned”, claiming that 
recording remains according to a fixed level provided a helpful “Anhaltspunkt”, or reference 
point, and that “Jacquet has been aware of the … [Wheeler] method but chose the [fixed-
level] mapping”.86   
 Yet continued problems in the field meant that this attitude slowly altered. During the 
1956 excavation season, the 4m.-wall had continued to cause confusion. That March, for 
instance, Anthes seemed uncertain of the wall’s meaning; excavating downwards, he could 
not understand the construction history of a “tomb Z” that had been built into the structure 
some time after its initial construction. The tomb appeared to rest upon a layer of debris 
above the wall, and Anthes could not see that the wall had once existed at the height of the 
tomb.
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 As a result, he also could not see that the wall, as the team had initially presumed, 
had once surrounded the small temple of Ramses II. By April, this situation changed slightly. 
Anthes noted that a “[vertical] cut [i.e. a section] … shows the 4-m-wall [sic] in a height 
more considerable than we would have expected”.88 Within the layers of mixed-up debris in 
this cut, the team at the site could almost see the original height, and the original role, of the 
wall. That they did so, though, was accidental. During the 1956 season, the trench (trench D) 
containing the 4m.-wall had already been divided into a western, mostly excavated, and 
eastern, newly excavated, section. Instigated as an attempt to make the trench more 
manageable (the cut was named the “relief wall”),89 this division inadvertently constituted the 
sort of grid excavation system put forward by Wheeler, and forced attention upon the 
contents of the vertical section in the middle of the trench in a way that the excavation 
previously had not. Yet even as this change in perspective took place, Anthes still noted that 
“we have recognized the value of vertical cuts, but I have to restrict myself in view of the 
time pressure”.90   
 In June, though, the final clearance of the relief section in advance of its recording by 
Jacquet inadvertently revealed how the mixed-up structures that were visible in it were 
related. Like Wheeler’s system itself, the actual practices of excavating this section were 
little, if at all, different from what had come previously. But the perspective that the relief 
wall forced was different and, more importantly, could be easily connected to Wheeler’s 
rhetoric. In the section, the “Enclosure Wall” of an already well-known temple dedicated to 
the god Ptah now became visible. Previously, Jacquet had considered that this structure was 
“built contemporaneously with, or slightly later than, the time when the [small] temple [of 
Ramses II] … was abandoned”. Anthes considered this event to “have happened at any time 
later than Ramses II, but probably not long after”.91 After removing the baulk, however, a 
possible date of “not long after” became impossible to conceive; Anthes and Jacquet re-dated 
the construction of the Enclosure Wall from the late second millennium B.C. to a thousand 
years later or more. This Wall could only be Ptolemaic (332–30 B.C.) or later, because the 
baulk showed “a cut [was present] sloping down toward [the] Enclosure Wall”. In turn, 
Anthes and Jacquet interpreted this cut as having been made to construct the Enclosure Wall, 
meaning that the structure “was built after all the [nearby] layers accumulated”.92 These 
layers contained Ptolemaic pottery, providing the date for this act of construction.
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Perceiving the entirety of the cross section, it thus also became apparent that the 4m.-wall 
was not constructed to protect the small temple of Ramses II from later incursions. Rather, 
the structure was the enclosure wall of that temple. Yet until the much later construction cut 
of the Ptah Enclosure Wall was viewed in sectional context, this interpretation was 
impossible: in section, the team could see that, after the small Ramses II temple had fallen 
into disuse, building had occurred to its north and its south at various points in time. The Ptah 
Enclosure Wall had helped to seal debris from this building in place, occluding the 4m.-
wall’s original function by compounding the denudation of the structure over time.94  
The inadvertent construction of a vertical section in an attempt to deal with material 
difficulty had given a semblance of order to Mit Rahina. At least for Anthes and his 
collaborators, a complex ancient settlement had started to cohere. And the team now claimed 
that the dig presented a huge opportunity: if presented the correct way—if made into a 
boundary object—fieldwork at that settlement could illustrate the monumental marvel of 
ancient Egypt. In his end-of-season report, Anthes wrote that “our site now stands in a more 
significant position with regard to the whole Memphis area than could be realized before”, 
and that “excavating in Memphis . . . appears exceedingly worthwhile and important”.95 
Moreover, a drawing was made by Jacquet depicting the lucky section in a Wheeler-esque 
manner (Fig. 6.). Here was a chance to make excavation at Mit Rahina persuasive again; the 
section and its illustration constituted the boundary object that might make this act of 
persuasion possible. Anthes later stated that “we learned by our own experience the fact 
which is elementary outside of Egypt, that only a coordinated system of horizontal and 
vertical cuts [in the ground] is adequate for the understanding of a site which has 
accumulated under changing living conditions …”.96 The question now was whether his 
words, and Jacquet’s depiction, were persuasive. 
 
Objects of Failure 
 
Ultimately, the pair’s claims failed to make much headway. In India, as noted earlier, 
Wheeler’s representations of fieldwork enjoyed continued success beyond independence and 
partition. But the people who authorized the excavation of Mit Rahina did not take great 
pleasure in the excavation of this muddy site, even if a city could now be teased out of the 
ground there. Wheeler’s universal field methodology did not enjoy universal success. The 
boundary object of the section and the rhetoric surrounding it failed to persuade the relevant 
audiences. Different geographies of the post-war past started to develop as issues linked to 
Mit Rahina’s materiality helped to hasten the excavation’s end. 
 The process of terminating the excavation involved the close-to-symbiotic action of 
the DoA and UM, and helped to constitute Mit Rahina—and other Egyptian settlement and 
floodplain sites like it—as near-permanent topics of polemic.97 At the end of the second 
season at Mit Rahina in June 1956, the UM’s Board approved continuing the excavation.98 
Yet during a meeting in April 1957, the Board postponed the proposed third season of work 
at the site, a move that would later lead to total cancellation.
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 The object of the dig 
constituted one cause of this termination, the objects obtained by digging another. At first, 
Rainey and the Board had been prepared to give Anthes and his team the benefit of the doubt, 
despite Percy Madeira’s misgivings. A couple of weeks before the Wheeler-style strategy had 
been adopted at Mit Rahina, Rainey told Anthes that “I have just had a long talk with Mr 
Madeira and we have decided that we should, by all means, accept your recommendation for 
another season”. Yet Rainey also said that “I must honestly admit that I am not at all clear in 
my mind about the significance of the site”.100 Rainey made it clear that the dig needed to 
become more persuasive. However, the eventual adoption of the Wheeler strategy as a 
boundary object did not manage to persuade. Claims relating to vertical sections did not even 
seem to register with the UM’s leadership, despite Rainey’s 1951 statement that “more 
emphasis should be placed on interpretation and the meaning of field results in terms of the 
nature of cultural growth and historical process”.101 In mid-October 1957, Rainey wrote to 
Madeira after a meeting with the UM’s curators, including Anthes. Rainey stated that, with 
Madeira’s agreement, the work at Mit Rahina would be cancelled. The type of city that the 
UM had wanted to excavate was unlikely to coalesce: 
 
Because of the water level at Memphis we cannot excavate ruins of a City 
dating earlier than 1000 B.C., or late New Kingdom times. Therefore, the only 
possible excavations at Memphis are an extension horizontally with the object 
of discovering the plan of the City during the period from 1000 B.C. to the 
Islamic Conquest. This would be an unlimited type of excavation extending 
over a long period and would inevitably be at great cost. We do not think that 
the information to be derived from such an excavation is worth the time and 
cost.
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The section failed, because it represented the continued prospect of further moribund 
work visualizing the “layouts … [and] development … of the city”.103 The UM wanted the 
excavation to deal with something more spectacular. Moreover, Rainey’s reasoning made 
clear other, connected issues. Above, I noted Madeira’s concern with “worth while [sic] 
discussion of objects”. The UM had just remodelled its Egyptian gallery, and was buying 
objects for its Egyptian collection.
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 Excavated artefacts constituted an institutional concern. 
Towards the end of the second season at Mit Rahina, Anthes had told
 
Rainey that, if he 
cancelled the excavations, “there is the possibility that we get finds for our museum. The 
choice is not great and our record of starting with much palaver and stopping after two years 
is not impressive”.105 Now, though, Rainey appeared to throw caution to the wind. The 
possibility of continuing work only to recover objects dating from the late New Kingdom and 
post-imperial period did not seem “worth the time and cost”. These objects would be as 
uninspiring as the section drawings that accompanied them, and would certainly not equate to 
the sort of earlier, hieroglyphically covered monuments that Rainey’s comment implies his 
institution considered worthwhile. Wider concerns connected to the UM’s Cold War 
priorities did not even enter the equation. 
The UM used the aftermath of the 1956 Suez war as a cover for terminating the 
excavation. Minutes from the Board’s April 1957 meeting state that “because of the 
uncertainty of the political conditions in Egypt”, they had “agreed it was advisable to 
discontinue work at Memphis”.106 Yet ironically, this same conflict—and the heightening of 
revolutionary and non-aligned action that it gave rise to in Egypt—also seemed to strengthen 
the hand of the DoA, which now felt quite able to inform the UM of its expectations 
regarding future work in the country. By April 1957, Mustafa Amer had been replaced in his 
position; first, and briefly, by Abbas Bayoumi (1904–1983) and then by Moharram Kamal 
(1908–1966).107 Anthes had already warned Rainey that “any loosening of continuity [of the 
joint work] at this moment would put us in a very wrong [sic] light in the eyes of our 
[Egyptian] friends as well as the [Egyptian] opponents of the work”, at least partially because 
“Amer is almost certainly going to retire”.108 His prophecy came true. In late October 1957, 
even before Rainey had managed to write to him to cancel collaboration, Kamal wrote to 
Rainey to politely but firmly state that the UM’s concession at Mit Rahina was to be 
terminated. Kamal also asked whether Rainey’s institution could now work in Egyptian 
Nubia.
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 Egypt—independent, assertive and about to start construction of the Aswan High 
Dam—would now, at least in theory, call the shots and direct excavation work. Collaboration 
at Mit Rahina did not matter. But, notably (and as for the UM), collaborative work on 
monuments elsewhere did. Even if Jacquet’s section drawing illustrated the existence of a 
city at Mit Rahina, the image’s status as a boundary object failed because the settlement that 
it illustrated did not show the monumentality required. 
Sometime towards the end of 1955, the DoA published a volume entitled Report on 
the Monuments of Nubia Likely to be Submerged by Sudd-el-ʿĀli Water. The Report appeared 
as plans for the construction of the new Aswan High Dam—the Sudd-el-ʿĀli of the 
publication’s title—gathered pace, and alarm rose that the reservoir (now Lake Nasser) that 
would form behind the Dam would submerge Nubia’s ancient monuments forever. Dealing 
with the most high profile of the many modernization schemes now being undertaken in 
Egypt, the volume was the authoritative word on how ancient Egyptian antiquities should be 
treated as Egypt’s revolutionary project unfolded. Monumental epigraphy was the 
watchword. The publication set out how to record the architecture of Nubian monuments, in 
addition to the inscriptions on them. Sometimes (as in the case of the temples of Abu 
Simbel), the book also noted how they might be saved from flooding through physical 
intervention.
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 The Report (purposefully written in Arabic, English and French) also noted 
“the hearty welcome of the Egyptian archaeologists to the assistance of some of their foreign 
colleagues”, and mentioned “that if UNESCO has any intention of presenting any pecuniary, 
material or scientific aid to Egypt . . . we have to thank it deeply”.111     
 Despite these pleasantries, foreign institutions were mostly uninterested in excavating 
in Nubia. For instance, in 1956, Anthes warned Rainey against the possibility due to a 
presumed lack of interesting objects to excavate in the region, and others took similar 
measures.
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 Working in Nubia would represent a concession to Egyptian wishes with no 
potential material benefit. Yet, by late 1957, the DoA hardened its stance against this attitude. 
International collaboration relating to the recording of Nubian monuments now started to be 
promoted through the auspices of the United Nations’ Expanded Program of Technical 
Assistance, which had worked with Egypt’s Ministry of Education to set up CEDAE, the 
Centre d’Étude et de Documentation sur l’Ancienne Égypte, in 1955. The institution worked 
to document the Nubian monuments, and in particular to visually replicate them through a 
process of photogrammetry. It also seemed to represent the future: Anthes told Rainey that 
“although I should no means recommend striking after a close connection . . . it seems to be 
wise to be present at work when the Center fully develops”.113 He was correct. The 
collaboration at Mit Rahina had failed, no ancient city had appeared, and the boundary object 
created to make future work at the site seem worthwhile—not to mention offering the 
possibility of ordering unruly labourers—had been rejected. But Egypt had moved on to 
cooperation around other monumental visual concerns. As Moharram Kamal had made 
perfectly clear, the question was whether or not institutions like the UM would now heed the 
DoA’s wishes.          
  
 
Conclusion: Thinking Through the Post-War Past  
 
The material qualities of Mit Rahina and the personnel problems that the site prompted 
helped to constitute the way the field team working there represented their work. The team 
used a visual strategy promoted by Mortimer Wheeler; a boundary object around which the 
interests surrounding the excavation could gather. But representing the site in this way failed. 
The strategy seemed to offer too little, too late, and the chance to test the methodological 
possibilities of the Wheeler-esque representation—whether in terms of the future 
investigation of the site or in terms of ordering the people who worked there—never arrived. 
This boundary object failed to do its job. Constituting a revolutionary, monumental past 
elsewhere in Egypt (or taking elements of that past back to America), seemed more important 
than the visual reconstruction of a mass of muddy archaeological strata at Mit Rahina. Their 
patience tested by what seemed like an uninspiring site and a misbehaving workforce that 
made the excavation’s already half-hearted training element seem worthless, neither the DoA 
nor the UM had the patience to see where Wheeler-style methodological claims might lead 
the work. No ancient city would be unearthed at Mit Rahina. 
 The constitution of a Wheeler-esque archaeological section at Mit Rahina had offered 
hope to those leading the work there. As the site itself failed to pull together the initial array 
of interests surrounding the excavation, so the uncovering of the section and the process of its 
illustration took on the boundary object role that the site might otherwise have played, 
offering the hope that those interests could gather around the excavation routine that the 
section represented. Yet the ‘site’ never became one, not even in sectional form. Intermeshed 
with the struggles of the people who excavated there, the layers of earth and ancient debris at 
Mit Rahina exerted too strong a force over the interests at hand. Giving the lie to narratives of 
decolonization and the Cold War that place all agency relating to decision-making in the 
realm of top-down geopolitics and the global ‘centres’ attached to it, the struggle to work 
with this complex materiality spread that agency in a dispersed network that fanned out from, 
but was never permanently centred in, Mit Rahina. Terminating work at the site, the Board of 
the UM decided that they had other fish to fry.
114
 The DoA seemed more concerned with the 
revolutionary prospects of monuments in Nubia.  
 Small acts can contribute to large outcomes, and vice versa. The failure of the 
archaeological work at Mit Rahina—and, in particular, the failure of the relief section of 
trench D as a boundary object—therefore begs questions about how we should think about 
the making of knowledge about the past in the post-war world. Wheeler wrote Archaeology 
from the Earth to smooth over the politically complex world that archaeologists worked in, 
even as it acknowledged the existence of wider political realities; the volume existed to 
produce a visually distinctive post-war past whose constitution could, to a great extent, be 
directed from London. Conditions at Mit Rahina, however, meant that this process of 
flattening did not take place. The archaeological boundary object produced there could not be 
used to draw together the necessary interests. There were, of course, other programmatic 
attempts to order the past in this era. Yet if this Egyptian example is indicative of these wider 
realities, the post-war past and its relationship with wider histories of decolonization and the 
Cold War was complex, lumpy and recursively constitutive of what went on around it, rather 
like the earth at Mit Rahina.  
In order to understand this situation and its implications, scholars need to follow the 
bottom-up processes of making this past in conjunction with the networks of which it formed 
a part. They also need to think through concepts—like that of the boundary object—that can 
help to illustrate how these networks came into being or fell apart. For instance, what 
boundary objects, if any, did manage to draw together the large number of conflicting 
interests surrounding the making of the post-war past, and why? Did the utilization of such 
objects help to constitute certain people as credible authorities in the making of this 
knowledge? To what extent did the discipline of archaeology and its relationship with 
material culture play a role in this situation, and how (if at all) did previous practices relating 
to the excavation of ancient material change? Asking such questions, scholars will start to 
understand the post-war past, and the histories like those of decolonization and the Cold War 
to which it was joined, in new and different ways. 
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